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Bulgarian interbank market. Three empirical models are developed in order to explain the behav-
iour of demand, supply and interest rates. The impact of reserve requirements, operations con-
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1 Introduction   
The motives for studying the interbank money market could be sought in several directions. 
First, where a Currency board (CB) is involved, usually two of its advantages are cited: (i) its 
ability to restore and maintain credibility in money and the financial system and (ii), the exis-
tence of an automatic adjustment mechanism. Credibility and especially the automatic mecha-
nism (symmetric dynamics of the balance of payments and the money stock) require flexibility in 
the other parts of the economic system and especially in the interbank money market (for de-
tailed description of Bulgarian currency board see annex 3). Whereas under CB arrangement the 
central bank does not pursue monetary policy and has severely restricted LLR functions, it is not 
possible to provide liquidity to banks and manipulate interest rates through changes in reserve 
money1. In this configuration, banks should rely on the interbank money market. The develop-
ment of this market, its depth and volatility acquire particular importance in the analysis of CB.  
Second, analysis and modeling of money market are instrumental to the construction of an 
overall systemic risk model and simulation of various types of shocks that could provoke it. Un-
der CB, being a static arrangement, the systemic risk has severe consequences. 
Third, the study of interbank market interest rates and especially overnight interest rate could 
be used for analyzing the term structure of interest rates and the dynamics of economic agents' 
expectations, respectively. More, Bulgarian money market experience shows that there are days 
when interest rates rise dramatically (see chart 1). This brings to the fore the question of the op-
timal volatility of interest rates and the factors behind its fluctuations. 
Fourth, modeling of this market gives a starting point for studying the relationship between 
fiscal flows and liquidity and between fiscal policy and the CB in general. This element is related 
to the ongoing discussion of the role and efficient management of the government's fiscal re-
serves (included in CB liabilities). 
Our ambitions in this paper can be reduced to the following: (i) identification of the institu-
tional characteristics of the Bulgarian interbank market, Part 2 (ii) analysis of the factors impact-
ing interest rates dynamics, liquidity demand and supply, summarized in a theoretical model, 
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 For detailed description on CB operation see Hanke (2002).  
Part 3, (iii) an empirical test of the model with daily data for the period 01.12.2001 – 04. 11. 
2003, Part 4.  
Our ambitions are also motivated by the fact that there are only two empirical studies, more or 
less related to the problems of the interbank market. Petrov (2000) makes a systemic analysis of 
the demand and supply of commercial banks' excess reserves, and Nenovsky et al. (2001) 
establish that fiscal reserves affect the monetary base and as a consequence interbank market in-
terest rates dynamics (liquidity effect). 
 
2 Institutional framework of Bulgarian money market  
 
Generally, CB sets the framework of possible operations on the Bulgarian interbank market 
and its structure.  
Lev operations prevail in the currency structure (the key characteristics of the money market 
are presented in chart 1 and in the tables and charts in Appendices 1 and 2). The other two major 
currencies - Euro and US dollar - have smaller volumes and operations in British pounds, Swed-
ish and Norwegian crowns are negligible. The average levels (for the period January 1998 - No-
vember 2003) of monthly volumes in the lev money market as % of M1 and M2 aggregates ac-
count for 30% and 12% respectively.  
Major market instruments are unsecured deposits, secured deposits and repo agreements. For 
the period January 1998 - November 2003 unsecured deposits prevail, accounting for 77% of to-
tal operations in the lev money market. The dynamics during this period is as follows. Initially, 
after the adoption of the CB and the legacy from the severe financial crisis of 1996-1997, the 
share of unsecured deposits was about 40%. In the period 1998-2002 a sustainable upward trend 
developed. After January 2001 trust among major participants in the banking system increased 
whereby the share of unsecured deposits reached an average level of 91% (combined with con-
tracted volumes and shares of secured deposits and repo agreements).  
The maturity structure of the lev money market is dominated by overnight unsecured deposits 
which demonstrate an upward trend both in share and volume in the period (since the beginning 
of 1998 till now). Throughout the review period unsecured overnight deposits account for an av-
erage of 60% in the money market and from the beginning of 2001 to November 2003 their  
average level rose to 81%.  The high share predetermines in part the focus of the present study – 
unsecured lev overnight deposits.  
Daily data about the volume of overnight deposits show that their volume typically varies be-
tween BGN 25 and BGN 100 million. The mean for the period since the beginning of 1998 is 
BGN 65.7 million with standard deviation of BGN 21.9 million. The interest rate usually varies 
from 0 to 5%, and the mean is 2.22%, the standard deviation is 2.58%, with the maximum of 
28.51% (!) hit in April 20032. Dramatic interest rate fluctuations focus our attention as they are a 
major factor that could trigger a possible liquidity crisis; therefore it is necessary to study the fac-
tors behind such dynamics.  
 
 
Chart 1. Interest rate dynamics and liquidity dynamics on the interbank money market in Bulgaria  
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 The analysis of the fisrst diferences of the overnight interest rate shows that the 94% of the observations are within the interval 
(-2; 2), 84% within  the interval of (-1;1), and 71% within the interval of (-0.5; 0.5). 
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To understand the above-mentioned structure, however, the key institutional characteristics 
setting the framework of the money market need to be described.  
Under discretionary monetary policy, interest rate on overnight deposits could fluctuate within 
specific limits. Overnight rate moves within a corridor determined by the possibility for deposit-
ing or receiving funds at (or from) the central bank. The minimum limit of the corridor is the in-
terest that banks receive after depositing excess liquidity with the central bank (deposit facility). 
The upper limit of the corridor is the interest paid by banks on receiving liquid funds from the 
central bank (marginal lending facility), against an acceptable collateral (for details see Gaspar et 
al., 2003). Under CB, the central bank does not set a base interest rate and does not enter into 
such relations with commercial banks. By construction this allows biggest fluctuations of over-
night interest rate. 
The first important factor establishing the institutional framework of the money market is the 
regulation of minimum reserve requirements (MRR). Meeting the requirements for specific funds 
availability on accounts with the Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) is a major factor determining 
the behavior of commercial banks and their liquidity needs. The basis of setting the amount of 
minimum reserve requirements is the banks' attracted funds in lev and foreign currency (with up 
to two-year term) without those from local banks, which funds form the so-called deposit base. 
The banks maintain MRR in lev or foreign currency (US dollar, Euro, Swiss franc). The period 
of monitoring the deposit base of banks in order to determine the amount of MRR is called a 
base period and it coincides with calendar months. The period in which the banks must maintain 
MRR starts from the fourth day of the reporting base period and ends on the third day of the next 
reporting period and is called maintenance period. The total amount of MRR to be reached by 
each bank at the end of the maintenance period is determined as a product of the sum total of the 
deposit bases of the bank through all days of the base period and the percent of MRR (8% since 
June 2000 and 11% before that). From this product the sum total of the bank's available cash in  
lev in vaults and ATM terminals through all the days of the base period is deducted.3 A bank is 
considered to have met MRR if the amount of reserve assets maintained with the BNB through 
all the days of the maintenance period is equal to or higher than the above calculated amount 
(banks are entitled to use up to 100% of MRR, but they pay penalty rate on the amount above 
50%). The BNB does not pay interest on the required MRR amount.  
The second major factor impacting money market liquidity is the behavior of the government. 
The item "Deposits of the government and budget organizations" is included in the liabilities of 
the Issue Department (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Bulgarian Currency Board balance sheet 
 
Issue Department balance sheet 
ASSETS LIABILITIES 
Cash and accounts in foreign currency  Currency in circulation 
Monetary gold  Bank deposits and current accounts 
Foreign securities  Government deposits and accounts 
  Banking Department deposit 
 
Banking Department balance sheet 
ASSETS LIABILITIES 
Non-monetary gold and other precious 
metals 
Borrowings from IMF 
Investment in securities  Liabilities to other international financial 
organizations 
Loans and advances to banks  Capital 
Claims on government  Reserves 
Bulgarian’s IMF quota and holdings in 
other international financial organizations  
Retained profit 
Deposit within the Issue Department   
 
The main reason for this is (in addition to the fiscal agent function of central bank) transpar-
ency on the funds available to the government to cover its liabilities to local and mostly foreign 
creditors. The deposit of the government reflects cash inflows and outflows related to the activity 
of the Ministry of Finance and the other primary budget spenders, including budget payments 
and foreign debt operations. To optimize the organization and process of payment of the Minis-
try of Finance with the other economic agents the so-called single account at the BNB was cre-
                                                           
3 As of 1 July 2002 100% of the available cash in banks' cash desks are counted toward MRR (until that date only 60% were 
counted to MRR).   
ated aimed to cover and centralize revenues and expenditures of budget spenders. According to 
the Law on the State Budget for 2003, it includes funds on budgetary, extrabudgetary, suspense 
and deposit accounts in lev and foreign currency with the Bulgarian National Bank of the central 
budget, ministries, agencies, the National Audit Office, the Bulgarian National Television, the 
Bulgarian National Radio, the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, higher schools, the judiciary au-
thorities, the National Social Security Institute and the National Health Insurance Fund.  
Budget-related cash flows have a major impact on the liquidity in the banking system as they 
decrease or increase available funds of commercial banks depending on the nature of the opera-
tions effected by them. The principles and mechanism of payments and the centralization of 
revenues in the Single Account of the spenders serviced by the BNB and commercial banks are 
embedded in the specifically established to the purpose System for Electronic Budget transfers 
(SEBRA) through which the limits and payments of the spenders participating in the system are 
managed and controlled. Through SEBRA a connection is made with the interbank payments 
system. Since the beginning of 2001 the Ministry of Finance began progressive integration of 
budget spenders into SEBRA. Statistical data describing the main flows in the Single Account 
are available since 1 December 2001 which predetermines the period used in the empirical 
evaluation of the money market.  
In the middle of each moth there is concentration of tax payments, exerting pressure on the 
money market and dramatic interest rate fluctuations. Slightly reduced volatility is observed after 
the end of May 2003 when the BNB allowed commercial banks to buy Euro against levs with 
same day value date through the funds maintained on their MMR accounts with the BNB. This 
ensured partial liquidity to cover their liabilities. In addition, as of 1 June 2003 the real-time 
gross settlement system RINGS started operation for big, systemic important payments, which 
allows better monitoring and management of commercial banks' liquidity. Through the old sys-
tem BISERA operating before, payments were not effected in real time and this led to sizeable 
cautionary demand for liquidity by banks as they had no information on their incoming current 
payments and had to ensure more liquid funds for the normal execution of all ordered payments 
for the day. BISERA continues operating along with RINGS, for payments of no systemic im-
portance (amounts less than BGN 100,000).  
  
3 Theoretical elements of the study   
Although the objectives of the study are mainly empirical, some theoretical aspects should be 
noted (for theoretical review of different approaches to the money market see Ewerhart et al., 
2003).  
First, we model the overnight interest rate whose behavior is central not only to any money 
market and discretionary central bank (as a part of transmission channel), but, as we have seen, it 
is of key significance for the Bulgarian money market (Part 3). 
Second, as we already stated, this study uses high frequency data – daily observations. Use of 
daily data is most appropriate for the analysis of money market volatility and eliminates the het-
eroscedasticity of the series (Hamilton, 1996). GARCH models provide good possibility to cap-
ture not only the factors that affect liquidity demand and supply and the interest rate, but also to 
identify the factors determining their volatility. 
Third, modeling of the seasonal behavior of liquidity and interest rate is particularly interesting 
(emphasized in the literature, Hamilton, 1996).  
Fourth, we construct three independent equations (for liquidity demand, liquidity supply and 
the interest rate) specifying in detail the various factors affecting them. 
 
(1) Equation of liquidity demand  
 
ε α α α α α α α + + + + + + + = ) ( 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 lags L forex Spread G RR i L
D D  
i –  comprises OVNINT variable (this is the interest rate on overnight unsecured deposits 
denominated in levs, which is the price of demanded liquidity, and expected relationship with the 
volume is reverse). 
RR – a vector comprising variables related to the minimum reserve requirements, namely: 
MRRBGN, which is minimum required reserves (MRR) in levs. Demand for reserves in order 
to meet the regulation requirements influences interbank liquidity, which is the source of liquid-
ity funds. The expected relationship between the variables is positive because if reserve require-
ments increase then the demand for liquidity rises. 
MRRFX – MRR in foreign currency. The above-mentioned effect still holds – when reserve 
requirements increase demand for liquidity rises.  
G
D  - a vector describing the influence of government operations upon the demand for depos-
its. We put the following variables here: 
B_NOBUDBUD – payments through BISERA, without BNB participation, from non-budget 
persons and organizations to the budget. This variable is very important and when it increases the 
systemic liquidity decreases and this, in turn, leads to rise in the demand for overnight deposits. 
This variable is forecasted hardly by the banks and very often the concentration mainly of tax 
payments in the middle of the month leads to large market fluctuations.  
B_BUDBUD – payments between budget organizations without BNB participation. This vari-
able is forecasted easier by banks due to better payment coordination and planning as a part of 
budget process.  
Spread – this variable presents the spread between bid and ask EUR/BGN exchange rate on 
the interbank market. Widening in this systemic risk estimator is expected to increase the precau-
tionary demand in the banking system.  
Forex – here, we examine the FX variable, which presents the exchange of euro against levs  
between commercial banks and BNB4, and its growth should lead to decrease in demand for de-
posits, as it is an alternative source of liquidity.  
 Lags – lags of the dependent variable, which capture the inertia in the demand for liquidity. 
 
(2)     Equation of liquidity supply 
 
ε β β β β β + + + + + = ) ( 4 3 2 1 0 lags L Season G ER L
S S  
ER – represents the influence of excess reserves. It consists of the following variable: 
ERBGN – excess reserves denominated in levs. If there are excess reserves, banks act opti-
mally aiming profits and try to allocate these excess reserves on the interbank market and to earn 
incomes, which increases the supply of overnight deposits.  
G
S – shows the impact of government on supply. It consists of the variables: 
B_BUDNOBUD – payments through BISERA, without BNB participation, of budget to non-
budget organizations. It increases the systemic liquidity, is easily forecasted by banks and influ-
ences positively the liquidity supply.  
                                                           
4 Positive sign of the variable indicates that commercial banks buy levs against euro.  
PENSIONS – pension payments through the Single account. It is easily forecasted and leads to 
increase in banks’ available funds due to the transfers from the government’s deposits to their re-
serves at BNB and enables them to supply more deposits.  
REV_BANKS – other payments from the budget to the banks through the Single account. 
Bank reserves, systemic liquidity and the ability to supply deposits rise. 
Season – includes dummies to model the seasonality: 
D2 – represents the beginning of maintaining period on MRR regulation. The effect of meet-
ing minimum reverse requirements is weaker because of possibility for averaging the funds 
needed during the whole maintenance period. It enables banks to supply more overnight deposits 
in order to earn incomes. Conventionally, it leads to a growth in supply and a fall in interest rates 
(Hamilton, 1996). 
D_DEC – represents the influence of the last month in the year – December. On principle, the 
presence of great number of holidays during the month declines banks’ willingness to supply li-
quidity. Many payments are made from and to the budget and the precautionary motive strength-
ens due to harder forecasting. We should pay much attention to December 2001, which preceded 
the introduction of euro notes and, thus, required bigger liquidity from any bank.  
Lags – represents lags of the dependent variable and measures liquidity supply inertia.  
 
(3) Equation of interest rate 
 
ε β β β β γ γ + + + + + + = ) ( int 5 4 3 2 1 0 lags i ovneur Season G ER i  
 
ER – represents the influence of excess reserves. It consists of: 
ERBGN - excess reserves denominated in levs. If there are excess reserves banks need less re-
serves and are able to supply more free funds and the interest rate is expected to fall. 
G – shows the influence of government operations on the interest rate. Consists of the follow-
ing variables: 
B_NOBUDBUD – payments through BISERA, without BNB participation, from non-budget 
persons to the budget. This variable is very important and when it increases the systemic liquid-
ity decreases and this, in turn, leads to rise in the demand for deposits. As we pointed out above,  
it is forecasted hardly by the banks and concentration of tax payments in the middle of the month 
implies higher interest rates.  
B_BUDNOBUD – payments through BISERA, without BNB participation, from budget to 
non-budget persons. It increases the systemic liquidity and is easily forecasted by banks and in-
fluences positively the liquidity supply and leads to a fall in interest rates. 
BI_NOBUDBUD – payments through BISERA and executed by BNB. It also includes trans-
fers from non-budget persons to the budget, which are forecasted hardly and should raise interest 
rates. 
EXP_BANK – bank expenditures on transfers to the budget that are forecasted hardly and are 
made through the Single account. They decrease banks’ funds and are expected to raise interest 
rates. 
Season – shows the influence of seasonal factors: 
D3 – dummy for days in the middle of the month, when tax payments are concentrated and 
there are high volatility and increase of interest rates. 
D_NOV – dummy for November. In 2002, the lack of budget policy optimization led to con-
centration of large budget outflows in the end of the year. This process started in November and 
raised to great extent the systemic liquidity and the expected impact of it is a fall in interest rates. 
D_APR – April. The conclusion of the previous accounting year is in March, so in April there 
are large tax payments. This implies higher demand for liquidity and is forecasted hardly by 
banks, so, the interest rate rises. The interest rate reached the highest levels in the middle of April 
2003.  
D_WEEK – dummy that includes Fridays and days preceding holidays. These days are charac-
terized by higher precautionary demand and interest rate.  
OVNEURINT – interest rate on overnight deposits denominated in euro. It is examined as an 
opportunity yield to interest in levs and the expected relation is reverse5. 
In equation of interest variation we use seasonal variables, apart from the conventional ARCH 
component: 
                                                           
5
 The comparison between interest rate on overnight deposits in levs and eonia is not compelety correct because of the fact that 
there are lags between maintenance periods in Eurozone and Bulgaria. The effects at the end and in the beginning of the 
maintenance period take plays at different days of the month. The idea is to adapt our maintenance period to this in the 
Eurozone during the convergence stage.  
D4 – days in the end of the month. Two factors are combined: approaching the end of main-
taining period and tax payments. Large interest rate fluctuations are observed. 
D_JAN – January. In principle, there is a lot of liquidity in the banking system, excess re-
serves and, thus, interest rate fluctuations are smoothed.  
4 Empirical results and discussion 
The results from the econometric estimations of equations (1), (2) and (3) are shown in Table 
16.  
The source of the data is BNB statistics. Use of high frequency data limits to some extent the 
number of available variables. The daily basis allows for an in-depth analysis of the factors that 
impact the behavior of dependent variables but it sets requirements to the methods of economet-
ric modeling. The data are unique for Bulgaria, not published officially and available only at the 
BNB. They are monitored on a decentralized basis and this is the first attempt to incorporate 
them in an integrated analysis.  
Data about dependent variables are based on the money market statistics, orderly series exist-
ing and being maintained since the beginning of 1998. Interest on deposits exchanged on the 
money market is the mean based on the transactions effected throughout the day. Monthly in-
formation on interest is the mean based on the volumes in the respective days of the month. Data 
about the money market are available only on business days, which entailed only their inclusion 
in the analysis. This required processing of the series used in to obtain coincidence of the peri-
ods.  
The beginning of the period of analysis is predetermined by the beginning of constructing an 
orderly and economically grounded system of cash flows under the Single Account, which hap-
pened in early December 2001. It was then that the beginning of the series of data on budget in-
flows and outflows was put, based on primary accounting information.  
Another source is BISERA, maintaining series of the various types of transfers within the set-
tlement system at specific time. Accumulation of data on the behavior of the RINGS payment 
system will allow (in the future) to elaborate the analysis by including additional factors.  
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 Daily data are used, including only business days. Data about the volumes and the various types of cash flows are in thousand 
BGN, data about interest rates are in percent and the spread between ask and bid price is in BGN.  
 We also used daily data about commercial banks' reserves at the BNB, the division being 
mainly into required and excess reserves and into lev and foreign currency components. 
Before running the regressions we checked for unit root, and we found that all the series are 
stationary7.  
In a whole, the results shown in Table 2 demonstrate expected signs of the impact of different 
factors on the behaviour of the liquidity at interbank market, as well as of the overnight interest 
rates, that we have mentioned in Part 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
7
 All tests are avaibale from autorhs upon request.
  
Table 2: Empirical results 
 
 Model  1 
(interest rate) 
Model 2 
(demand for liquidity, L
D) 
Model 3 
(supply of liquidity, L
S) 
Variables*   Dependent variable  
Interest rate 
Dependent variable  
Liquidity volume 
Dependent variable  
Liquidity volume 
Mean  equation 
Ovnint(-1)   0.62 (41)  -660.12 (-2.35)   
D(ovnint(-2)) -0.04  (-3.93)     
Ovnvol (-1)    0.68 (15.9)  0.85 (37.8) 
D(ovnvol(-1))    -0.16 (-3.36)  -0.25 (-4.78) 
ERBGN(-1) -3.43E-06  (-18.86)    0.02  (2.22) 
B_nobudbud  2.70E-05 (23.4)  0.08 (1.95)   
Exp_bank 9.50E-06  (11.58)     
B_budbud -1.16E-05  (-8.9)     
B_budbud(-1)   -0.19  (-2.58)   
BI_nobudbud 0.0004  (3.41)     
Ovneurint   -0.11 (-6.31)     
MRRBGN   0.03  (4.25)   
MRRFX   0.02  (3.84)  
Spread   14085635  (3.42)   
FX   -0.16  (-2.18)   
B_budnobud(1)     0.16  (3.09) 
Pensions(1)+Pensions(2)     0.06  (3.12) 
Rev_bank(1)+rev_bank(2)     0.09  (1.84) 
D2     9890  (4.42) 
D3 0.37  (6.22)     
D_apr 0.64  (9.98)     
D_nov -0.41  (-6.74)     
D-dec     -7674  (-2.69) 
D_week 0.14  (3.16)     
Variance equation 
intercept 0.11  (5.72)  2.09Е+08 (19.69)  2.22Е+0.8 (17.96) 
Arch(1)  2.78 (12.38)  0.12 (2.21)  0.12 (2.06) 
D4 1.17  (5.45)     
D_jan -0.09  (-3.41)     
      
      
R2 0.53  0.50  0.46 
R2 adjusted  0.52  0.49  0.45 
log likelihood  -630  -5305  -5308 
* z values in parentheses 
 
5 Conclusions  
 
The models of the Bulgarian money market presented by us have good technical characteris-
tics and can be used in forecasting the dynamics of liquidity and interest rates. The hypothesis 
that the cash flows of the government need cautious monitoring and forecasting is confirmed, as  
well as the importance of the institutional innovations (development of the payment system, etc.) 
for the dynamics of this market. This gains particular importance in the conditions of CB, when 
the central bank cannot pursue active monetary policy.  
Notwithstanding its development, the Bulgarian money market still has not reached that level 
of maturity when banks will build longer-term relations (credit lines, etc.8). Clearly, the market is 
still segmented and fragmented and individual banks' behavior does not "accommodate" other 
banks. A microanalysis of the interbank liquidity at bank level will be particularly interesting, 
making an attempt at explaining not only the behavior of the two groups of banks (those gener-
ally borrowing funds and those generally providing funds), but also making an in-depth analysis 
of the two groups. Our efforts in the next study of the interbank market will focus on this. 
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 On the importance of the relationships between banks, see the analysis of Cocco et al., (2003).  
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Annex 1  
 
Monthly data (mln.)
Unsecured 
deposits
Unsecured 
overnight 
deposits
Secured 
deposits
Repo
Total 
money 
market
Euro USD
Minimum 140 55 4 20 286 128 40
Maximum 2204 2146 115 396 2396 764 522
Mean 978 818 38 155 1173 394 190
Standart 
deviation 572 558 22 82 543 168 96
 
 
Monthly data - shared of total money markets (%)
Unsecured 
deposits
Unsecured 
overnight 
deposits
Secured 
deposits
Repo
Minimum 39.7 16.0 0.3 2.1
Maximum 97.2 92.0 17.9 51.8
Mean 76.9 60.2 5.0 18.0
Standart 
deviation 17.2 24.5 4.8 13.2
 
 
Money 
market/M1
Money 
market/M2
Minimum 0.12 0.05
Maximum 0.47 0.18
Mean 0.30 0.12
Standart 
deviation 0.09 0.04
Monthly data - shares in monetary 
aggregates
 
 
Daily data - overnight unsecured deposits
Volume         
(mln. levs)
Interest (%)
Mean 65.74 2.22
Median 63.85 1.56
Maximum 141.84 28.51
Minimum 2.00 0.21
Standart 
deviation
21.90 2.58
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Some trends of Bulgarian money market 
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More on Bulgarian Currency Board 
 
 
Currency boards (CBs) are typically viewed as some sort of monetary constitution which 
strengthen the confidence in the monetary system and contribute as a whole to financial 
stability.9 In practice, currency boards appear in a great institutional variety (Schuler (1992), 
Camilleri Gilson (2002)). This diversity can be explained by the specific historical context, 
namely, the fact that currency boards were established during different historical periods such as 
for instance in the colonial and post-colonial period, or during the period of post-socialism. 
When disregarding the details, we can summarize the basic features of modern currency boards 
as follows:  
First, CBs include a legally provided fixed exchange rate pegged to a stable foreign currency, 
which has strong reputation for preserving purchasing power. It is obligatory for monetary 
authorities to exchange the national currency upon request against the reserve currency 
(convertibility principle). In some configurations the reserve currency circulates as a legal tender 
along with the national currency (as it was f. ex. the case during Argentina’s Convertibility 
period). Second, under a CB the domestic money supply is legally backed (fully or partially) by 
reserve assets which can easily be converted into the reserve currency. As the currency supply in 
modern economies exceeds by much the reserve currency (compared to 19th century for 
instance), this type of regime is more like a fractional form of a gold standard. Third, under CBs 
there is typically no or only minimal room for monetary policy and lender of last resort 
functions. Interest rates, typical instruments of discretionary acting central banks, are formed on 
the interbank money market under CBs. Fourth, CBs include liberalization of capital movement 
and price flexibility (including interest rates and salaries). This requires an appropriate 
institutional framework in place for the major economic players. When all these conditions are 
met there is an "automatic" link between the balance of payments dynamics, the reserve currency 
                                                           
9 Besides the issues of credibility and confidence there are some additional similarities between CBs and the gold standard: (i) 
existence of an automatic mechanism, which links both money demand and supply to the balance of payments and leads to a 
relatively quick adjustment; automaticism means that one way or another there are cause-and-effect chains and two-way 
interaction whereby without the discretion of a central monetary authority (or with it, while, however, observing the “rules of the 
game”) the balance is adjusted (restored) after a shock, and (ii) both monetary regimes significantly constrain domestic economic 
policies.   
and, finally, domestic money supply. Thus, there is almost no room for discretionary decisions of 
politicians or central bank officials.10 
 Although it is quite hard to define the pure form of a currency board, Hanke (2003)11 made 
an attempt to define such an archetype which will be called “orthodox currency board” in the 
following. This attempt is quite useful since it allows us to highlight the specific characteristics 
of the various existing currency boards and helps to explain the success and failures of CBs. 
Hanke believes that orthodox CBs are those, which in addition to a fixed exchange rate have a 
few other features, in particular (i) they do not hold domestic assets in their balance sheets, (ii) 
they have only banknotes and coins as liabilities, (iii) they guarantee full convertibility, (iv) they 
do not have a lender-of-last-resort function, (v) do not regulate commercial banks, (vi) can not 
finance government, and (vii) the foreign exchange reserve coverage is 100 - 115%. However, 
when we in fact use this definition of an orthodox CB, then all contemporary forms of CBs have 
to be judged as unorthodox (Nenovsky and Hristov (2002)). In the literature we often find the 
distinction between first- and second generation currency boards. While the term “first 
generation currency boards” is used for colonial CBs which are quite close to what Hanke calls 
orthodox CBs, second generation currency boards have a number of discretionary elements. We 
highlight the nature of these discretionary elements in the next sections at the examples of the 
Bulgarian and the Argentine CBs. However, a common element of these (and additional) second 
generation currency boards is that they were introduced to end severe financial crises during 
which the national currencies lost their basic functions12. Second generation CBs are often 
introduced after a period of fiscal dominance of monetary policy and highly discretionary acting 
central banks. Again, Argentina and Bulgaria are good examples in this respect. Both countries 
                                                           
10 When comparing CBs with the gold standard some additional features of CBs stand out. First, when studying 
examples from history it could be noticed that a CB is a domestic monetary arrangement most often employed by 
individual, usually not advanced, small or medium size economies, while the gold standard was in most of the 
periods an  international monetary arrangement. The countries which operate CBs are typically "peripheral" 
economies. Moreover CBs are typically established in specific periods, such as for instance: (i) during the transition 
from a colonial system to a national discretionary acting bank (the colonial system) and (ii) after a period of 
financial crisis, which is itself caused by the monetary discretion of a central bank (Latin America and East Europe). 
Second, unlike the gold standard a CB is a constructed monetary regime; it does not evolve from the long and 
spontaneous evolution of money, but rather as a result of the competition (and cooperation) of certain groups of 
economic actors (Nenovsky and Rizopoulos (2003a,2003b)). Third, contrary to the gold standard the sources of 
confidence into the national currency are external (imported confidence), and are not based on previous experience, 
that is, from the evolution of monetary policy itself.  
11 A less detailed definition of an orthodox CB has been given by Schuler (2003), p.19.  
also shared another common feature - a so-called “crony economy” and a very poor quality of 
the political process. The hope to overcome these fundamental (crony) characteristics was one of 
the reasons for the CB introduction, and ironically, one of the major threats for the stability of 
the CBs.13  
In bulgarian case (see table 1) the balance sheet of the Issue Department, which in practice 
plays the role of the currency board, includes international assets, covering the department’s 
liabilities. The liabilities are comprised of items typical of an orthodox currency board: 
banknotes and coins, and items typical of second generation currency boards: commercial bank 
reserves, government fiscal reserves and net worth expressed by the deposit of the Banking 
Department. The item recording the net worth of the currency board also exists in the orthodox 
variant but in this case it only plays the role of a buffer which absorbs shocks triggered by asset 
operations. A positive net worth (expressed by a Banking Department deposit) allows second 
generation currency boards to perform at least some discretionary monetary policy and provides 
an opportunity for exercising a strictly limited LOLR-function in the case of systemic banking 
crisis. 
The Banking Department deposit provides the link between the Issue Department and the 
Banking Department and also reflects the relationship between the government and the central 
bank. The relationship between the government and the International Monetary Fund passes 
through the central bank (article 45 of Law on the BNB). This is due to the fact that drawing 
rights received from the IMF are recorded twice in the balance sheet of the Banking Department. 
On the one hand the IMF quota is a liability of the Banking department with respect to the IMF, 
on the other hand it is an asset of the Banking department that is deposited in the Issue 
Department. Within 90 days of receipt, IMF-tranches are transferred to the government account 
whereby the Banking Department deposit decreases and the government deposit increases by the 
same amount. In the balance sheet of the Banking Department this transformation is recorded by 
crediting the deposit at the Issue Department and debiting the central bank lending to the 
government item. When the government does not utilize borrowings from the IMF they stay 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
12 In this respect (restoring stability after crisis) some similarity can be down with gold standard restoration in 
European countries after the First World War (see for more details Bernholz (2003) and Moure, 1998). 
13 The stability of the Argentine CB and the crony economy in Argentina are analysed in della Paolera and 
Taylor (2002). For a study of the relationship between the corruption-inducive environment and the CB in Bulgaria 
see Nenovsky et al. (2003).  
within the Banking Department deposit, thus providing larger funds for the currency board 
LOLR function.  
Under the Bulgarian CB the main channels of monetary discretion could be divided into two 
types: traditional and new. The first type is associated with functions inherited from the classical 
central bank and the second is determined by the specific design of modern, second generation 
currency boards.  
According to classical central bank instruments, in most currency board countries minimum 
required reserves were preserved to different degrees. In Bulgaria minimum required reserves 
are set in the standard way. This leaves room for central bank manipulation of reserve money 
and money supply through changes in the level and the reporting methodology for commercial 
bank minimum required reserves. Usually this tool is used quite sparingly though, despite 
existing opportunities. In Bulgaria the level of minimum required reserves was set at 11 percent 
of the commercial bank deposit base upon the introduction of the currency board and has not 
been modified till June 2000. This is true despite the country’s exposure to adverse external 
shocks related to the Russian Financial Crisis and the Kosovo War. In April 1998 the 
methodology of reporting minimum required reserves was modified to provide more commercial 
bank autonomy and flexibility in liquidity management. Since July 2000 BNB has decreased 
minimum reserves requirements from 11 percent to 8 percent. This decision represents the 
strategic long run policy of the central bank to gradually reduce the reserve requirements to the 2 
percent Euro-area level. After some hesitations in the middle of 2003 the decision to keep 
government money within the central bank in order to offset shocks generated by the policy of 
the Ministry of Finance (establishment of a single fiscal account within the central bank) was 
preserved.    
A second function of the central bank under a new generation currency board is to serve as a 
lender of last resort (for a more detailed description see Berlemann and Nenovsky (2003)). BNB 
may extend loans in BGN to banks through the Banking Department (up to the level of central 
bank excess reserves) in the event of a liquidity risk affecting the stability of the banking system 
only to solvent banks experiencing an acute need of liquidity that cannot be provided from other 
sources. Such loans could be extended only against collateral of liquid assets and the loan 
repayment term shall not exceed three months. BNB's Regulation N6 defines liquidity risk as a 
situation where the amount of the ordered but unpaid payment documents in the RTGS  
(previously in the existing net payment system BISERA) exceeds 15 percent of its total amount 
for each of the last two days.  
Another discretionary channel of monetary policy under second generation currency boards is 
given by the choice of liabilities that have to be backed by reserve currency and the degree of 
backing. In first generation currency boards liabilities have to be backed at a 100 percent level 
and the assets to back currency board liabilities have to be issued by nonresidents. Departures 
from this principle provide possibilities for the pursuit of discretionary monetary policy. 
Inclusion of government fiscal reserves on the liability side of a currency board (i.e. covering 
them with international reserves) is the major channel of monetary policy transmission in the 
Bulgarian and Lithuanian  versions of currency boards. Therefore, revenue and expenditure 
policies have a direct impact on reserve money and money supply. In addition privatization 
revenues, which are a major part of foreign direct investment inflows in the country, go directly 
to the government deposit with the central bank. This mechanism creates a kind of automatic 
sterilization of foreign direct investment inflows as far as the central bank is obliged by law to 
invest its reserves in securities issued by nonresidents (in the case that those privatization 
revenues are not used to finance government expenditures). In other words, the government may 
conduct (intentionally or not) some kind of monetary discretion. This mechanism can destroy the 
automatic link between balance of payments dynamics and reserve money dynamics (Nenovsky 
and Hristov (2002)). Under these circumstances money market disequilibria do not disappear 
with interest rate adjustment, as they do under an orthodox currency board, but rather require a 
management of government reserves in the central bank’s balance sheet. Using this opportunity, 
the government is capable of executing discretion, integrating fiscal and monetary policies into a 
syncretic whole.14  
 
                                                           
14 Extensive research has been conducted to explore treasury of treasury activity on the liquidity conditions and 
central banks monetary policies (see for more a survey Petrov, 2000). The main difference under a currency board is 
that - since central banks do not conduct any kind of monetary policy operations - treasury activities create 
asymmetric liquidity shocks which could not be offset in practice by the central bank. For instance, Petrov (2000) 
concludes that treasury operations are the most significant source of shocks on Bulgarian interbank interest rates. 
Nenovsky et al. (2001) found liquidity effects when the fiscal reserve movements impact interbank interest rates. 
From our point of view major arguments in favor of the inclusion of government reserves on the liability side of the 
currency board balance are that free movement of capital and high capital mobility cause large capital flow volatility 
which directly influences reserve money and interest rates since they are automatically linked to the balance of 
payments. Under these circumstances government fiscal policy approximated with fiscal reserve dynamics in the 
balance sheet of the currency board may offset shocks and help smooth reserve money and interest rate fluctuations.  
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